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EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF THE INTERNET
RESOURCES AND ITS PRICING
MAKOTO TAKASHIMA
OVERVIEW
With the use of the Internet being rapidly proliferated among people, congestions
in transmission lines and other facilities and delays in communications have
brought the topics of efficient ulilization of network resources and consumers'
welfare to great concerns of economists in the field of telecommunications-related
problems. This paper discusses the relation of congestion pricing with the welfare
of the Internet society with the use of a model of a basic network structure
characterized by hierarchical connection between backbone and service providers,
and shows that the pricing scheme internalizing adverse effects of externalities on
network can lead to the optimal allocation and utilization of the resources in
realizing the maximal social welfare in this layered structure run by a co-operative
agent and can be complied with economic behaviors of both users and providers of
the Internet services in competitive circumstances as well.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet was initiated by ARPANET, the computer networking program of the U.S.
Department of Defense in the late 1960s and developed by succession of NSFNET, the
program of connecting supercomputer centers created by the NSF around the United States.
Those years, the network was run by a non-profit organization under the NSF award for
scientific projects and the use was restricted to non-profit activities. Thence, a new
administrative non-profit entity, Advanced Network Systems, was instituted with the
contribution of Merit, IBM and MCI for the resources in order to meet the demand from
for-profit concerns. This development has produced the general practice of the Internet
pricing that users pay connection fees only and are allowed for unlimitted usage of the
network for transmission0'.
It was easily anticipated that we were to face the classical "problem of the commons" in
that the overgrazing of the Internet resources would produce their inefficient utilization
and allocation and deterioration of users' utility due to congestion as the use was continued
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(1) See Kahin,B.(1995,1996), MacKie-Mason.J.K.and H.R.Varian(1995), and Varian, H.R.Q997).
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in this way. In fact， the NSFNET backbone experienced significant congestion in 1987， only 
two years after when it launched its program， and after that， as the Internet came into wide 
use with the free entry of providers， ithappened that a localnetwork as a whole suffered 
temporary suspension of working. Nowadays， it is rather usual that we experience 
congestion of communications and traffic delays in some parts of the Internet. 
This problem is caused， at least economically， by the above described pricing and cost 
bearing practice shaped in the development process of the Internet which had been nurtured 
mainly by public subsidization and private contributions for the nonprofit purposes. 
Moreover， its functional or technical features make the solution difficult with inherent 
relations to the costbearing issues. The Internet involves technological revolutions which 
can be called a change of paradigm in telecommunications network. Brian Kahin gives the 
Internet a functional definition that“it encompasses the set of interconnected and 
interoperating networks which make use of the internet protocolCIP) and a common 
addressing scheme"(2). Accordingly， itis generally understood that the Internet is a network 
of networks， but in order to recognize the new paradigm， attention should be given to its 
specific method of data transmission， i.e.，“packet exchange" ， which is essentially different 
from that of traditional communication networks such as telephony. This new technology 
has realized efficient utilization of scarce telecommunication resources and enhancement of 
users' benefits by increasing network externalities owing to its nature of openness which 
enables the network to expand freely. The new transmission technology using packet 
exchange makes networks “connectionless"， enabling users to share the scarce bandwidth 
more efficiently by allocating it randomly to the packets of any data and any senders in the 
way called “statistical multiplexing". This means that the Internet treats al the packets 
from any data， e.g.， e-mail， real-time message， urgent text， or audio-visual contents， in the 
equal fashion， no matter what content the data may have and what urgency it may require. 
In the circumstances， while the Internet is regarded as a very promissing innovative 
technology expected to contribute to the human society in the coming century， there have 
increasingly appeared the social costs of externalities caused by overuse of the network 
resources， and thus a field of research called “Internet Economics" is budding out these 
years with main interests in the pricing schemes and efficient resource allocation and usage 
in the Internet markets. A series of recent works by Jeffrey MacKie-Mason and Hal Varian 
deserves special attention among others of this field. They evaluate social costs caused by 
the increase in the traffic volume in congestible networks with connection to the 
technological features of the Internet， and analyze appropriate pricing mechanisms for 
(2) See Kahin，B.(1996)， P.7. 
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realization of efficient allocation of the network resources. As an operable devise in the real 
transactions，“they propose a scheme called a smart market": the market is cleared 
periodically by the cut-off price which internalizes the congestion costs and is set to be 
compared with users' bids for packet transmission(3). Moreover， they discuss that increase 
in traffic originated by an individual user gives birth to social costs of degradation of 
utility of all the other users due to the rise in congestion caused on the network resources 
by that traffic increment， and explain that introduction of the scheme of congestion price 
reflecting the effects can encourage efficient utilization of resources and lead to optimal 
social conditions in a single layered network model{4}. 
Following the studies made by MacKie-Mason and Varian， William Lehr and Martin Weiss 
extend their modeling framework to encompass any number of networks on a single 
network domain through which packets travel in various ways. According to this 
generalized model， they show that congestion prices presented by the former authors proved 
socially optimal in general and that the prices can be formed as addition of those for local 
“on-net" traffic of each network through which the “internet" traffic travels; i.e.， the 
optimal congestion prices for any traffic can be set on the basis of only local information 
of costs and traffic(S). 
The work of Lehr and Weiss should be highly rated in that they showed using a general 
“network of networks" that congestion pricing becomes generally the optimal scheme for 
maximization of social welfare of the network. However， their analysis is for a set of 
homogeneous networks having no price settlements with foreign networks that should 
accompany the expansion beyond the boundaries: nowadays， connection with foreign 
networks is an essential ingredient of the structure of the Internet. Besides， itdoes not deal 
with sharp competition among for-profit providers in an explicite manner in their model: 
such a competitive structure is also a feature of today's Internet market. In this sense， as 
Shenker et al point out， their modeling framework can be said “separate situation setting" 
and considered as a model for “a single non-profit research network" or “networks within 
a single cooperative organization" (6). 
In this paper， we set a framework representing a basic network structure of the Internet at 
present and analyze a contemporary “problem of the commons" that an individual's usage 
of networks for his or her own benefit prevents Internet society as a whole from making 
efficient utilization of the scarce telecommunications resources， making account of what 
(3) See MacKie-Mason，J.K.and H.R.Varian(1995a). 
(4) See MacKie-Mason，J.K.and H.R.Varian(1995b). 
(5) See Lehr， W.H.，and M.B.H.Weiss(1996). 
(6) See Shenker，S.， D.Clark， D.Estrin， and S.Herzog(1996). 
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degree the analyses and resu1ts of MacKie-Mason = Varian and Lehr = Weiss can be viable 
under our layered structure with international connection and how they should be amended 
if not viable. We have already observed the rapid diffusion of the Internet in Japan these 
two or three years and have made a detailed inquiry into how the “network of networks" 
has been constructed along with the development of the market(7}. The whole network 
consists of networks supplied by many Internet service providers (ISPs) ， and for the 
analytical purpose， they. may be considered to be divided into two large groups， i.e.， 
backbone providers (BPs) and service providers (SPs). BPs are providers situated at a 
higher layer of the whole network which have their (own or leased) transmission circuits 
and supply other providers with connection service to their circuits while offering Internet 
services to their own end-users. Among them， there are those who have direct connections 
beyond country boaders with foreign networks. These providers offer transmission services 
of backbone to the whole network， and thus they can be called backbone providers. Another 
group is that of providers situated at a lower layer， having connection with one or more 
providers of the former group. Their main business is to supply general users with 
connection and other Internet-related services. We name entities belonging to this group 
service providers in this paper(8). 
Succeedingly， in Section 2， we present a basic model of a network structure and behavioral 
presurnptions about users and providers within it as the analytical framework here， based 
on the Internet structure in Japan (almost the same in other countries) described above. In 
Section 3， congestion prices are constructed so as to internalize social costs caused by 
network usage according to MacKie-Mason and Varian， and it is examined to what extent 
they can be established in the cooperative market structure under our layered network 
model expanded to inc1ude foreign connections. Moreover， account is taken of the 
conditions under which the capacity should be expanded for both SP and BP networks from 
the viewpoint of the total welfare of the Internet society. Section 4 analyzes the results in 
the industrial structure where both of SP and BP providers offer their services 
independent1y， as for-profit firms， and contrasts them with those under the cooperative 
organization in the previous section. While analyses up to this section are al under the 
assumed structure of supply side having two representative entities of a SP and a BP， ithas 
become an actual environment of the market todays that a host of private providers having 
various technological and business features offer services competitively to other providers 
and/or users for their profits purpose. Under this situation， itwould be of natural need to 
inquire into whether and to what extent the congestion pricing should be usefull in this 
(7) S田 Takashima，M.C1997a).
(8) As a matter of fact， itwould be hard to classify clearly each of the actual entities into either group. 
This classification is for the analytical purpose only， here. 
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competitive structure of our extended model. Section 5 discusses this problem. We 
summer包eal the resul ts 0 btained in this reserach and gi ve in rela tion to them a perspecti ve 
of the lines of further work to be tackled with， in Section 6. 
2. INTERNET COMMUNICATION MODE 
First of al， we explain the network structure of the Internet， features of the networks， 
types of traffic， and preferences of users. 
The Internet actually consists of complex interconnections with hierarchical structure 
between many Internet service providers of various sizes and technical characteristics， 
eventually offering connection and other services to numerous end-users. We classify these 
providers into two groups; upper layered group of backbone providers (BPs) and lower 
layered group of service providers (SPs). A representative provider is sorted out from each 
group of BPs and SPs and two networks of these providers at different layers are connected 
to each other. The selected entity BP has overseas connection with foreign networks but has 
no end-users for itself; i.e.， it offers only backbone transmission service to the other 
provider SP. SP supplies end-users with connection and other Internet-related services and 
sends data with foreign destinations to BP to have them transmitted beyond boundaries 
since it has no connection with foreign entities for itself; i.e.， SP offers Internet services to 
users and receives backbone service from BP. The present capacity (maximum bandwidth) 
of BP is KB and that of SP is Ks. All these are the features of the network structure on 
which we proceed to consider the problem henceforth. 
Next， we specify the details of end-users of the Internet services (we simply call them 
“users" hereafter). They are divided into two groups by types of network usage. One is a 
group of users sending data which both originate and terminate on the SP network domain， 
and the other is a group of users sending data which originates on SP network and is 
transferred overseas through BP network(9). We call the former users domestic 
communication users (DC users) and the latter ones foreign communication users (FC 
users)， and the respective data are named DC data (or traffic) and FC data (or traffic)， 
correspondingly. It is assumed that there are m DC users and n FC users， who are designated 
a number from i=l to i=m and from j=l to j=n， respectively. Traffic volume which DC 
user i sends is xi and that of FC user j isyi・Then，the total volume of DC traffic amounts 
to X( =XI+…+xm) and that of FC traffic becomesY(=Yi+…+Yn). In addition of these 
(9) Using th巴terminologyby Lehr，W.H.，and M.B.H.Weiss(1996)， the former data is called "on-net" traffic and 
the latter corresponds to "internet" traffic. A user actually making both types of usage may be treated as two 
different users each of whom makes a single type of them. See note 4 of Lehr and Weiss (1996). 
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traffic X and Y originating on the SP network， we have traffic originating on the overseas 
network. This enters our network domains through the channel connected between our BP 
network and the foreign one， and travels on them to users having subscription with the SP 
network. We call this overseas communication (OC) traffic. The volume of this traffic 
from overseas users Z is determined by the conditions outside our network and presumed to 
be a given constant value. 
As to the traffic on each of the network domains， three kinds of traffic of DC， FC and OC 
data travel past each other on the SP network domain， and two kinds of traffic going out 
for foreign destinations (FC data) and coming in for domestic users (OC data) are on the 
BP network. Hence， denoting the total volumes of traffic on the SP and the BP network 
domains by Ts and Ts， respectively， we have Ts=X + Y +Z and Ts=Y +Z. Then， the values 
of capacity utilization of those networks， i.e.， degree of congestion of recources， Rs and 
Rs， are described as Rs=Ts/Ks and Rs=Ts/Ks・
That is the basic model of the Internet for the analysis in this paper. Subsequently， we 
explain the relations of payments between users and SP and between SP and BP concerning 
the demand and supply of the Internet services in this network. Firstly， we assume “two-
part tariff" for fees which users pay to their provider SP， i.e.， a constant subscription (or 
initial connection) charge S plus fees based on usage (packets sent). We assume that 
different prices are set for packets of on-net (DC) traffic and internet (FC) traffic， and 
denote them by Ps and Py， respectively. Hence， payments of a DC user i become S+Xi • 
Ps， and those of a FC user j are S+Yi • Py. 
The transaction of SP is like this: it receives the above service fees from m DC users and n 
FC users， and pays the provider BP the backbone service fees of a two-part tariff consisting 
of the initial connection charge of B and use fees depending on the volume of traffic to be 
transfered; B+ Y・Ps.Here， Ps is a price set for SP to ask BP to transfer inernet traffic 
from its customers to the overseas destinations through backbone circuits. BP receives the 
service fees from SP and， besides， has exchanges of payments with foreign entities in regard 
to international communication under their settlement agreement. 
In actuality， this settlement concerning the share of revenue from international 
communication is carried out by bilateral talks between the entities at each end of a specific 
connection route. An “accounting rate" is decided for international communication through 
a given route between those two carriers concerned and then the share for each party is 
negotiated. As usual， the agreed accounting rate is divided in half， but sometimes unequal 
splits are introduced on some political or economical reasons. This final agreement for 
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share of an accounting rate is called a “settlement rate"， and each international carrier 
pays for traffic originating on its side and receives fees for traffic sent from the other side， 
based on this settled unit price. Concerning the settlement on charges of international 
communication， there usually exist difficu1t problems arising from the imbalances in the 
flow of traffic between two parties concerned. It may be an interesting subject to be 
discussed in the field of telecommunications-related studies， but it would not be suitable 
for us to deal with the problem here further in relation to the subject of this paper. 
Considering the actual system of sharing revenue from overseas communication， we assume 
that the accounting rate is splited in half to decide the shares of revenue between BP and its 
foreign partner， and a unit price for traffic for both sides is settled to be Pf (settlement 
price). Then， BP pays its foreign partner net fees of Pf・(y-Z). On the other hand， BP pays 
SP the sum of a part of fees received Z ・Pfin order to have the traffic entrusted by its 
overseas entity delivered to the final destinations， i.e.， domestic users. This is a payment to 
be handed over to SP and assumed to be Z ・Ps.Here， Ps is a unit price for the acceptance 
and forward delivery of overseas originating traffic by SP. 
In the analytical framework described so far， we have some kinds of prices. While the 
subscription or initial connection charges S and B and the settlement rate Pf are assumed 
given values， al the other prices are considered to vary， reflecting qualities of data 
transmission or networks. Unit prices of the part of use-based fees which users pay to SP 
are determined in relation with qualities of transmission; Qx for on-net (or DC) traffic 
and Qy for internet (or FC) traffic. On-net traffic originates and terminates on the same 
SP network and hence Qx depends on the degree of congestion of the SP network Rs. We 
assume that there is a relationship between them represented by a differentiable， decreasing 
convex function Qx D(Rs). Regarding the quality of internet traffic Qy， it can be 
considered sum of the effects of congestion of both SP and BP networks since the traffic 
originates on the SP network and goes through the BP domain for the foreign destination. 
Therefore， the relationship between the quality and the network congestion may be written 
as Qy = D(Rs) + D(Rb) using the same functional form D as Qx. Other prices， Ps and Pb， 
are determined by the qualities of network resources of SP and BP， Qs and Qb， respectively， 
and they are related with each other in the same way; Qs = D(Rs) and Qb = D(Rb). 
Finally， we specify utility functions of users concerning usage of the Internet. While the 
utility of a user naturally increases with the volume of traffic he or she sends， it will 
decrease with a rise in his or her unsatisfaction due to traffic congestion or delays of 
communication. Thus， a user's utility for use of the Internet can be represented as a 
function of his or her volume of traffic and the quality of communication; i.e.， Ui(Xi，QX) 
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for SC user i， and Vj(Yj，Qy) for FC user j， where both Ui and Vj are differentiable and 
increasing concave functions. Furthermore， itis generally considered that each user does 
not know how many other users share the same network resources and how they use them 
(e.g.， volume， content， frequency， urgency， etc.) and that a user ignores the effect of 
congestion his or her traffic may impose on others. That is， the congestion effect caused on 
a user's utility by an increase in his or her traffic may be regarded as almost zero， in 
general. 
Under the framework of the Internet society described above， weconsider the problem of 
the pricing scheme and the efficient utilization of network resources which can lead to the 
enhancement of the whole welfare of the information society. In the next section， we 
introduce congestion pricing to internalize the social costs of usage and analyse its 
relations with users' behavior and the social welfare under a cooperative management of 
the network as the first industrial circumstance. 
3. CONGESTION PRICING AND EFFICIENT RESOURCE USE 
(1) Traffic Congestion Pricing 
Under the general descriptions and assumptions of the analytical framework given in the 
preceding section， we specify here the industrial situation that we firstly deal with. The 
network society is constructed by two entities connected with each other， a service provider 
SP and a backbone provider BP， and m DC users and n FC users， each subscribing to SP. BP 
has a connection with foreign networks and offers only backbone service to SP. The whole 
network is run by a sort of cooperative organization consisting of those providers and 
users， as the historical development of the Internet. 
It is generally recognized that pricing schemes without relation to usage (typically，“flat-
rate" pricing) are prone to lead to the so-called “problem of the commons" by “over-
grazing" the scarce resources. Actually， there always appear traffic congestion and 
communication delays in some parts of the network， and the adverse effects of overuse have 
been further intensified these days. Under the circumstances， we presume that the society 
thinks to resolve this problem by introducing a pricing scheme of imposing the social costs 
on users depending on usage of the resource， i.e.，“usage-based pricing". However， it does 
not realize efficient use of the network resources to set a constant unit price for a packet 
regardless of the variable condition of network congestion: the most part of the cost of 
communication network resources is the fixed cost of equipments like lines， routers and 
other switching facilities， etc.， and hence， when the network is not congested and large 
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bandwidth is available， free charge for traffic would be rather preferable for enhancement 
of efficiency in resource use and should lead to the increase in social welfare. On this 
account， the society decides to introduce a usage-based pricing scheme but to make a unit 
price variable according to the network congestion. 
Network use by a user causes congestion， to some extent at least， on the common resources 
of lines， routers and other communication facilities， leading to a fall in benefits of al the 
other users due to the delays of communication or drops of packets. The aim of setting 
prices reflecting the network congestion is to induce users to decide their behavior on a 
comparison between the value of sending information and the price for its transmission and 
to realize efficient use of scarce network resources of the society in complience with 
economic motives of individual users in order to cure the drawbacks of fixed pricing 
schemes. When a user sends more information， it increases congestion on the networks 
through which the information travels with the consequent effects of falling the quality of 
communication， resulting in the decrease in utility of al the other users. Hence， it is 
conceived that the decrease in utility is the social cost incurred by the use of network and 
we may devise a pricing scheme which imposes the cost on the user originating the extra 
traffic. When the network is congested， a user would dare send his or her information as 
long as he or she considers the information has a value comparable to the high price at that 
time. Otherwise， the user would refrain from sending it and await the network to be 
uncongested. Under these considerations， prices for domestic communication (SC) traffic 
and foreign communication (FC) traffic are written as: 
Px* = -L:kEm， k*j (auk/aQx) (δQx/δx) 
-L:j E n (avj/θQy) (δQy/ax) 
ー-L:kEm (δUk/θQx) (θQx/δx) 
-L:jEn (θVj/δQy) (δQy/ax) 
py* = -L:1 E n， 1* j (δV1/θQy) (δQy/δY) 
-L:jEm (θUj/θQx) (δQx/aYj) 
ー-L:1En (θV1/θQy) (δQy/θ巧)
-L:j E m (aUj/δQx) (aQx/ay) 
3-① 
3-② 
Although the above equations are originally constructed as the prices set for a particular 
SC user i and FC user j， respectively，these are the prices commonly imposed on al users， 
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since the effects of the extra traffic on quality of communication are not different with the 
sender and we have an assumption of users' ignorance about the effects of their 
transmission on their own utility. We proceed to analyse in the next subsection how this 
pricing scheme will effectuate efficient use of the network resources and how the prices can 
be evaluated in the real world if it deserves to be adopted. 
(2) 8ehavior of Internet users 
We first consider how individual users decide their communication volume under the prices 
set in the above way. Since they decide it so as to maximize their own utility from using the 
network， the principle of their behavior becomes as follows: 
Maxxj[uj (Xj， Qx) -S-xj ・Px*] 
From this， we obtain the next equation as a first-order condition: 
。[Uj(xj. Qx)]/δXj-Px* = 0 3-③ 
That is， a SC user i should decide his or her communication volume in such a way as .the 
marginal utility by additional usage is equal to its price. 
The next problem of the same kind as the above faces a FC user j: 
Maxyj [vj (Yj. Qy) ー S-Yj. py*] 
This optimization problem gives a first-order condition: 
。[Vj(町.Qy)]/均一py*= 0 3ー④
which has the same meaning as the case for a SC user i. 
The conditions derived above show that any user's choice is to send the volume to such an 
extent to satisfy the equation 3-(3) or 3-(4) according to the variable situation， no matter 
how the price is set. Denoting the communication volume of SC user i and that of FC user 
j as x; andガ， respectively， we know that the whole volume of traffic on the network is 
X. = x; +…+ x~ for on-net data on the SP network domain and y. = Y; +… y~ for 
internet data on SP and/or BP network domain(s) in the user equilibrium. 
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From the standpoint of the network organization， in turn， isthis state of network usage 
favourable to the society as a whole? In other words， does it realize desirable use of 
resources for the whole Internet society including both SP and BP providers as well as m +n 
users? 
(3) Social Optimal ity of the Whole Network 
We consider the optimal use of the network resources under the existing capacity Kb and Ks 
from the standpoint of this Internet society as a whole. The optimality here means the 
situation where the society attains the maximal welfare and the social welfare is measured 
by the total benefits net of the costs gained by al. the entities concerned including users， 
i.e.， net profits of SP and BPproviders and net benefits of m +n users. This is expressed as 
a function W of communication volumes of each user， 
W(X1 ，…， Xm ， Yl'…， Yn ; Ks ， KB) 
L;jEm{Uj (Xj ， Qx) ー S-Xj. Px} 
+ L;j En {Vj (Yj ， Qy) -S-Yj・py}
+ {B+ [Y . PB - Z . PsJ -CB (KB) -PF (Y -Z)} 
+ {(m+n) S+ [L;jEm (Xj . Px) + L;jEn (Yj・PY)J
-B-Cs (Ks) -[Y . PB-Z . Ps]} 
L;jEm Uj (Xj ， Qx) + L;jEn Vj (Yj ， Qy) 
-CB (KB) - Cs (Ks) -PF (Y -Z) 3-⑤ 
In this welfare function， the first and second terms of the right side of the first equation 
are the total value of net benefits from the network use of m DC users， xiCi = 1，…，m)， and 
that of n FC users， Yj(j = 1，…，n)， respectively. The third term represents net profit of 
backbone provider BP， and the fourth is that of service provider SP. In these terms， Cb and 
Cs are the costs of network facilities realizing the communication capacity (maximum 
bandwidth) of each network， and they are represented as functions of the capacity Kb and 
Ks， respectively， which are assumed to be differentiable and increasing. 
In order to make the social welfare of the Internet society as great as possible， the 
organization tries to decide the optimal supply of bandwidth to each of the users. The 
welfare maximization problem facing the organization gives a first-order condition for a 
DC user as follows: 
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'oW/δXj = O[Uj (Xj ， Qx)]/δXj 
+ ~kEm. k*jθ[Uk (Xk ， Qx)]/δXj 
+~jεnθ[Vj (Yj ， Qy)/OXj 
=δ[Uj (Xj ， Qx)]/δXj 
+ ~kEm. k*j (δUk/δQx) (δQx/δX) 
+ ~jEn (δVj/δQy)/(δQy/θX) 
o 3-⑥ 
Applying the congestion price formulated as the equation 3-(1) to this condition， we have 
the following relation: 
。[Uj(xj ， Qx)]/δXj - Px. 0 3-⑦ 
This corresponds with the condition of user's equilibrium for the utility maximization 
obtained in equation 3 -(3) for a DC user i. It means that the adoption of the pricing 
scheme internalizing the adverse effects of externalities by network congestion is not 
contradictory to users' behavior of maximizing their net benefits from the network use and 
that it could lead to an efficient allocation of the scarce resources. 
How about foreign communication through the backbone network? Differentiating the 
social welfare function W with respect to a FC traffic yi， we have a first-order condition for 
the maximization problem: 
δW/δYj= ~jεmδ[Uj (xj ， Qx)]/θYj 
十θ[Vj(巧， Qy)]/δYj 
+ ~'En. '*jδ[V， (y， ，Qy)]/θYj-PF 
~jEm (θUj/oQx) (δQx/θY) 
+θ[苅(巧， Qy)]/θYj 
+ ~'En. '*j (θV，/δQy) (δQy/θ巧)-PF
o 3-⑧ 
Putting the congestion price for a FC user P; ， this equation is rewritten in the following 
simple form: 
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。[Vj(Yj ， Qy)]/δYj - py* -PF = 0 3-⑨ 
This relation obtained from the social optimization problem differs by a settlement rate 
between provider BP and its foreign partner， Pr， from the equilibrium condition for FC 
users 
θ[Vj (Yj ， Qy)]/sYj - py* = 0 
which has already been shown in 3-(4). 
It is known from the nature of users' utility functions， i.e.， concavity with respect to the 
volume of traffic， that if the network is run under the original price P; applied to FC 
traffic;， the total volume of the traffic will exceed the optimal value to realize the efficient 
use of the network resources， resulting in a sort of“the problem of the commons" due to 
“over-grazing" by FC users. If the organization wants to maintain the optimal use of the 
network resources along with admitting such choices of individual users， itwill need to seek 
subsidies of the amount of Pf・(Y-Z) from outside of the Internet society. Consequently， if 
the organization likes to stay in a self-supporting entity， itwill be necessary for them to 
internalize with FC price the externalities caused by the additional congestion produced by 
such overuse of the FC users. 
The increase in FC traffic by d[yJ imposes an additional cost of d[Pr(Y-Z)] on the network 
or the whole society including the network in terms of the decrease in the level of the 
network welfare due to the rise in congestion or the subsidy to be borne by the outside 
world. Hence， itwill be a reasonable resolution of this problem to impose the cost on the FC 
users. That suggests using a revised congestion price for FC traffic， P;*， instead of the 
original one， P;， 
py** = -L;IE"n. l*j (δV1/sQy) (δQy/δY) 
-L;jEm  (θUj/δQx) (δQx/θyj) 
+d[PF (Y-Z)]/dYj 
py* + PF 3-⑩ 
Under this revised pncmg scheme， the first-order condition for the social welfare 
maximization with respect to FC traffic is rewritten as 
θ[Vj (Yj ， Qy)]/均一 py** 0 3-⑪ 
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which comes to correspond with the equilibrium condition for utility maximization of 
individual FC users. In this case， FC traffic price Pf' in the net benefit equation leading to 
the condition 3-(4) is presumed to have changed to Pf" at the beginning. 
The above analysis shows that the optimal use of the whole network can be effectuated in 
compliance with individual choices of users based on utility maximization by introducing 
the original congestion price， P;， for domestic communication and the congestion price 
revised to accommodate the additional social cost incurred by overseas transfer of traffic， 
P;' ， for foreign communication. This means that， regarding Internet pricing， a principle of 
internalizing the adverse effects of use on the network through traffic prices will serve 
solution of “the problem of the commons" in a more general sense than MacKie-Mason = 
Varian and Lehr = Weiss have suggested in their single layered models. 
Finally in this subsection， we inquire into the relation between P; for on-net (DC) traffic 
and P;' for internet (FC) traffic derived above. 
Using the functional relations between communication quality and traffic volume 
explained in the descriptions of the modeling framework in the first subsection， we arrange 
the expressions for those prices. We recall the relations 
Qx = D (Rs) 
Qy = D (Rs)十 D (RB) 
Rs = (~jEm Xj 十 ~jEn yj + Z)/Ks 
RB = (~jEn Yj + Z)/KB 
Applying these to the expression for domestic traffic 3-(3)， the congestion price is 
rewritten as follows: 
Px* = -C1/Ks) [~kεm.k ，，éj (δUk/δQx) (δQx/δRs) 
+ L:j E n (θvj/θQy)/(δQy/θRs)] 3ー⑫
The revised congestion price for foreign communication 3-(10) is also expressed as 
py** = -L:1ε n.l*j (8v1/δQy) [(θQy/δRs) (l/Ks) 
+ (δQy/δRB) C1/KB)] 
-L:jEm (θUj/θQx) (θQx/θRs) (l/Ks)十PF
in a similar way. 
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It may be assumed that an increase in traffic an FC user sends yi will have only a negligible 
effect on a certain DC user's utility Ui through the fall in quality of domestic 
communication Qx since the number of users， m and n， are very large. That is， 
(δUj/δQ) (δQx/δy)ξO 
Using our former presumption of user's ignorance about the adverse effect of own traffic 
along with this assumption， we have the following relation: 
py*ホー Px*+ PF 
-:2IEn (OV1/ δQy) (δQy/δRB) (1/KB) 3-⑬ 
Here， the third term of the right side of the equation expresses external diseconomies 
imposed on al the FC users through the rise in congestion on BP network caused by a 
marginal increase in traffic volume originating from an FC user (VYBY). 
(4) Revised Congestion Pricing and Conditions for Capacity Expansion 
With the use determined by the above institutional situation， the network realizes the 
efficient resource allocation and the maximum social welfare in terms of the total net 
benefit of the entities concerned under given capacity of each network of BP and SP. Then， 
the maximum value of the net benefit will vary according to the network capacities， and it 
can be represented by a maximum value function of variables， i.e.， W(Kb， Ks). Using this 
function， we go on to consider the problem of how the organization can know the situation 
to expand capacity. 
We begin with the SP network. If the organization expands that capacity Ks， itreduces the 
utilization rate of the SP network. This causes in turn the rise in use of each user on account 
of the increasing benefits from use of the Internet. With this effects in mind， 
differentiating the welfare function 3-(5) with respect to Ks， we have the equation of the 
first-order condition for the optimal capacity: 
θW/δKs = :2jEmθ[Uj (xj， ，Qx)]/θKs 
+ :2jEnθ[Vj (Yj' ，Qy)]/δKs 
-dCs/dKs-PF :2jEnθYj/δKs = 0 
Envelop theorem tells that the first-order conditions 3-(6) and 3-(8) with respect to Xi and 
yi should be stil established at this equilibrium point， and hence， using those relations and 
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the equation of the congestion price 3-(12) for DC traffic， we can arrange the above 
equation as follows: 
。W/oKs = RsPx* - dCs/dKs = 0 3-⑭ 
As to the capacity of the BP network， using the equation of the revised congestion price 3-
(13) for FC traffic as well as the same conditions 3-(6) and 3-(8) as the above， the similar 
arrangements give the following equation: 
δW/δKs = Rs [-L:1 E n (δv1/θQy) (δQy/oRs)・
(θRs/δy)] -dCs/dKs 
= Rs (Py**-Px* -PF) -dCs/dKs 
=0 3-⑮ 
The above resu1ts tel us the situation where the network capacity must be expanded. As 
regards the SP network domain， the capacity expansion will increase the total net benefit 
when the cost of total traffic on the SP domain measured by congestion price for DC 
traffic， (X + Y +Z) P;， comes to exceed the value of the capacity measured by the marginal 
cost of capacity， Ks(dCs/dKs). As regards the BP network domain， increasing capacity 
will become meaningful when the total social cost incurred on the BP domain by the 
marginal increase in FC traffic exceeds the value of capacity measured by the marginal cost 
of capacity， Kb(dCb/dKb). That total social cost can be measured a1ternatively by the 
cost of total traffic on the BP domain valued by the revised congestion price for FC traffic 
net of the congestion price for DC traffic and the settlement rate with the foreign network， 
(Y +Z) (P;.ーP;-pf). 
Turning back to the expressions 3-(12) and 3-(13) for our revised congestion prices， itwould 
be difficu1t to measure them on the basis of utility functions of individual users and quality 
functions of communications since in general they are not known in the explicit form. With 
the above relations for the optimal capacity being established， however， the prices can be 
rather easily found only by the information about the volume of traffic presently existing 
on each of the network domains and the values of their capacity as expressed in the 
following equations: 
Px* = [Ks (dCs/dKs)]/(X+Y+Z) 3-⑮ 
py村=Px* + PF + [Ks (dCs/dKs)]/(Y+Z) 3-⑪ 
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That is， DC price can be calculated on the information about only SP network， and FC price 
can be obtained by adding the BP capacity value per traffic on that domain and the 
settlement ra te to the DC price. 
4. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION(1) : MONOPOLISTIC SUPPLY 
So far， we have analized the use of the Internet in the industrial situation where the network 
is managed by a sort of cooperative organization after the historical fact of the 
development. As already described， the use has become wide-spread among the general 
public with for-profit providers entering the industry as suppliers of various Internet-
related services as well as network connection. Reflecting this reality， we are going to 
analyze the relation of congestion pricing to choices of the private entities concerned and 
examine to what extent the desirable resu1ts obtained in the non-profit environment will be 
maintained in the industrial organizations consisting of for-profit providers in the present 
section and the next. We deal with the industrial 'organization where services are supplied 
monopolistically in this section and analyse the case where they are supplied competitively 
by many private providers in each layer of SP and BP networks in the next section. In either 
case， we assume that there always exist numerous users with various tastes and preferences 
with respect to Internet use. 
The supply side in this section consists of an SP firm supplying connectiopn service to users 
and a BP firm offering backbone servise to the SP， and they make choices for maximization 
of their own profits. The other things remain unchanged. We assume that al the FC traffic 
originating from SP domain is accepted and delivered to the foreign network by BP 
provider. 
In this monopolistic situation， users have no choice of their own providers and decide their 
use， i.e.， volume of traffic， in consideration of communication quality， Qx or Qy， presented 
by SP and traffic price， Px or Py， set in the market at that time， according to the type of 
traffic. That is， users' equilibrium conditions are given in the same behavior of maximizing 







Each user determines his or her traffic volume， Xi or yh according to this condition， and 
subscribes to SP service when the net benefit becomes positive with the use of the network. 
However， al the traffic decided by the subscribers is not always accepted by SP provider， 
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because this monopolistic supplier SP can decide the total volume of supply of service on its 
own criterion， i.e.， profit maximization. Conversely， the volume which SP decides to accept 
is always met by demands for service by users， since many users are presumed to always 
exist with a diversity of utility functions. We assume that the numbers of users who 
actually receive service from SP are m for DC users and n for FC users. 
Next， the behavior of provider SP is to determine the volumes of supply of service， X for 
DC traffic and Y for FC traffic， and its transmission capacity Ks so as to maximize its net 
profit: 
Is [X・Px(Qx) + Y . py (Qy) + (m +n) S] 
一 [Y. PB (QB) + 2 . Ps (Qs) + B + Cs (Ks)] 4ー③
Although a monopoly SP could decide prices for DC and FC traffic on its own will， they are 
actually established in the market through the aggregate demand function with relation to 
the quality of communication for each type of traffic. Hence， the prices PX and Py are 
expressed as a function of the corresponding quality of communication Qx and Qy. SP sends 
the FC traffic originating from its subscribers to BP in order to have the traffic delivered 
to the foreign destinations through BP network. Pb is a price per packet which SP pays to 
BP for it. Ps is a price which BP hands over to SP for acceptance and onward delivery of the 
international traffic originating from BP's foreign partner. We consider that these prices 
are expressed as a function of the quality of networks determined by the respective degrees 
of congestion. Notice here that the quality of SP network， Qx， isequal to the quality of DC 
communication， Qs， which was already explained in connection with the description of the 
modeling framework in Section 2. 
Under those functional relations， the net profit maximization problem facing provider SP 
gives the following first-order conditions: 
Px = -X (θPx/δQx) (δQx/θX) 
-y (δpy/δQy) (δQy/δX) 
-2 (δPs/θQs) (δQs/δX) 
py = -X (δPx/θQx) (δQx/aY) 
-y (θpy/θQy) (θQy/aY) 





An increase in traffic by a DC user causes a fall in the quality of communication due to a 
rise in congestion of SP network， and it has an effect on al the kinds of traffic， X， Y， and 
Z， traveling on that domain. On that account， SP suffers a decrease in revenue due to a fall 
in prices. Equation 4-(4) means that the price for DC users equals the value compensating 
the fall in revenue resulting from an additional increase of packet in DC traffic in the 
situation where the monopoly SP determines the volumes of supply， X and Y (Z is given) so 
as to maximize its profit. On the other hand， equation 4-(5) shows that the price for FC 
traffic is constituted by the sum of the similar costs imposed by the increase in FC traffic 
and the total change in payment to BP through a fall in quality of BP network owing to the 
additional traffic (the second factor is the sum of the second and third terms of the right 
side of the equation and is designated PYBY). 
Attention should be paid here to the fact that an increase in traffic by a user has the same 
effect on the degree of congestion of SP network regardless of the type of the traffic and 
hence the difference in the types makes no different effects on the quality of DC 
communication Qx and moreover that the quality of FC communication Qy is expressed as 
the sum of the qualities of both SP and BP networks， Qs and Qb. Then， the price for FC 
traffic is written in the form， encompassing the price for DC traffic: 
py (Qy) Px (Qx) +δ[Y . PB (QB)]/δY 
-Y (δpy/δQy) (δQy/θRB) (sRB/δY) 4-⑥ 
The second term is the value denoted PYBY above. An increase in FC traffic rises 
congestion of BP network and it results in a reduction in revenue of SP on account of the 
fall in the price for FC traffic caused by the fall in quality of FC communication. We 
denote the value of the fall in revenue by YYBY， which proves equivalent to YVBY(lO). This 
is the third term of the above equation. 
The task of backbone provider BP is to deliver international traffic to domestic users and 
to the overseas destinations through that network， and hence， although it is a monopoly 
supplying the backbone service， the only thing that BP decides for its for-profit purpose is 
its transmission capacity Kb. This capacity for the traffic volume traveling on the BP 
network Tb determines the quality of that network and has influence on BP's profit 
through the effects on the price and the volume of FC traffic. We deal with the choice of Kb 
by BP later， relating to the problem of SP's decision on its capacity Ks. 
(0) Refer to the description leading to equation 4・⑬.
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The whole network structure in the present analysis remains the same as what we had for 
the analysis up to the previous sections. Only the difference between them lies in the ways 
of management of the network: while the network was run under a sort of cooperative 
organization with the aim of maximizing the total benefit as a whole in the previous 
analysis， it is assumed that two mutually connected networks in a layerd structure are 
managed by respective for-profit firms monopolistically in the section. In the present 
industrial organization， itis easily conceived that the profit maximization behavior of SP 
results in the transfer of part of users' consumer surplus to SP's profit， and above al， the 
total social welfare of the whole network will generally become smaller than in the case of 
cooperative management because of the profit maximization activities of two individual 
monopolistic firms in the present case. 
How is the prices of 4-(4) and 4-(5) (or 4-(6))， Px(Qx) and Py(Qy)， ralated to the revised 
congestion prices given in the previous cooperative model， P; and P;? The prices 
established in the monopolistic model can be considered to be higher， ceteris paribus， than 
those set in the the social welfare maximization of the cooperative model. Regarding the 
price for DC traffic， when there is an increase in DC traffic， the monopolistic firm SP will 
try to have the priceestablished in the market in such a way as to compensate the reduction 
in revenue resulting from a rise in congestion and additionally to cover the decrease in 
receipts from BP concerning onward delivery of international traffic which is incurred by 
the fall in quality of SP network， Qs (we denote the second cost by ZSX). On the contrary， 
in the case where the network is managed to maximize the total benefit of the whole society 
encompassing both SP and BP networks， payments and receipts between both providers and 
between SP and users are al offset by each other in the whole society and hence they do not 
appear as factors having any influence on the network management. 
Attention must be paid here to a difference in construction of prices between these two 
models: the prices in the model of monopolistic supply are found to be formed so as to 
compensate the fall in revenue which providers suffer owing to the rise in network 
congestion， while the prices in the cooperative model are set to internalize the external 
adverse effects which users suffer on that account. In the long-run equilibrium where users 
make a choice in consideration of the eventual fall in. communication quality due to 
network congestion， the reduction in revenue of SP caused by a fall in communication 
quality is equal to the value of external diseconimies given to al the other users of the same 
communication type when a user increases use of the network. It is shown like this. As 
regards the choice of a DC user， the first-order condition for the net benefit maximization 
is derived in the similar form to the equation 3-(3) in the previous section: 
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。[Uj(Xj ， Qx)]/θXj-px (Qx) = 0 4-⑦ 
Here， the price Px is not set according to the social cost of externality caused by network 
congestion by the cooperative organization but determined in the functional relationship 
with communication quality in the market. Now， when a user makes a short-run choice， 
taking the present communication quality to be unchanged， the above equation is written as 
4-(1). However， in the long-run situation where the communication quality changes with 
the degree of congestion in accordance with the changes in traffic volume， the above 
condition derived from the optimal behavior of a user is reduced to the equation: 
δUj/θXj十 (δUj/δQx)(θQx/δX) 
-Px (Qx) - Xj (δPx/δQx) (δQx/θX) 0 4ー⑧
On top of that， the equation 4-(1) should be established under Qx of the long-run 
equilibrium， and thus， we have 
(θUj/δQx) (θQx/θX) 
= Xj (θPx/aQx) (δQx/θX) 4-⑨ 
In our analysis of the effects of network congestion caused by the increase in traffic， the 
natural assumption is that a partial derivative" of quality of DC communication with 
respect to DC traffic is not zero. Thus， we have (changing i into k for the convenience of 
later developments): 
(δUk/δQx) Xk (aPx/aQx) 4-⑩ 
Adding this equa tion up across users of DC comm unica tion， k = 1，…，m， we obtain an 
expresslOn: 
~kεm (θUk/δQx) X (apx/δQx) 4-⑪ 
The congestion effect of the increase in traffic of a DC user i， Xi， on quality of DC 
communication does not differ from that of the increase in total traffic of the same type， 
X. Hence， a relation: 
-~kEm (θUk/δQx) (δQx/θX) 
= -X (apx/δQx) (δQx/δX) 4-⑫ 
is eventually established， ascertaining what has been postulated. 
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For FC communication originating from SP domain， itis proved that we have the similar 
relation 
-2:1 E n (OV1/δQy) (δQy/θy) 
= -Y (δpy/δQy) (δQy/θY) 4-⑬ 
In our original model， provider BP has a delivery contract with provider SP in a layered 
network structure to have overseas traffic accepted and brought to domestic users， and BP 
pays SP a variable price Ps(Qs) per packet for that onward delivery. On the other hand， BP 
has a contract with foreign carriers and they pay a constant (for a certain period of 
contract) settlement rate per packet to each other. Consequently， BP's revenue on that 
delivery of international traffic may change with the congestion situation on SP network 
which is not concerned with the conditions of BP's network. Hence， itmay be reasonable to 
make a contract of setting the Ps constant subject to the period of contract between BP and 
its foreign partners. When our model is partly changed in this way， Ps becomes constant 
with respect to quality of SP network Qs. If we further assume that BP decides the volume 
of supply of its backbone service (offer of bandwidth to SP) to maximize the profit， using 
the net profit function of BP 
I1B [Y " PB (QB) + Z ・Ps(Qs)] 
一[PF(Y一Z)]ー CB (KB) + B 4-⑬ 
we obtain the following relation: 
。[Y" PB (QB)]/OY PF 4一⑬
Applying those relations above obtained to communication prices Px(Qx) and Py(Qy) 
given by respective equations 4-(4) and 4-(6)， we have the resu1t that they are reduced to the 
revised congestion prices P;" and P;" ， respectively， which are set as 3-(1) and 3-(13) in the 
cooperative model. That is， when the delivery rate paid by BP to SP， Ps， is set constant 
with relation to a constant settlement rate， the traffic prices established in the market of 
monopolistic supply become equal to the congestion prices leading to the optimal use of 
resources， in the situation where the optimal volumes of FC traffic decided independently 
by SP and BP happen to correspond with each other. 
The congestion pricing was conceived to realize efficient use of network resources in 
compliance with the economic motives of users in a cooperative setting of the industry. 
From the analyses we have made so far， it's general applicability is suggested as an 
efficient pricing scheme in the decentralized situation where providers make a choice for 
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their for-profit purposes as well as in the centralized (cooperative) setting. 
Finnally in this section， we consider how each of providers SP and BP adjusts their network 
capacity to the market situation in the profit maximization behavior. For provider SP， 
from its net profit function of 4-(3) and the price equation 4-(4) for DC traffic， the first-
order condition with respect to its capacity is derived as: 
dITs/δKs X (δPx/θQx) (δQx/θKs) 
+Y (θpy/δQy) (θQy/δKs) 
+z (δPs/θQs) (δQs/dKs) 
-dCs/dKs 
= Rs . Px (Qx)-dCs/dKs 4-⑮ 
This means that expanding capacity increases SP's net profit when the value of total traffic 
on the SP network measured by DC traffic price exceeds the value of its present capacity 
evaluated by the marginal cost of capacity. We notice that this condition is substantially 
equivalent to the relation 3-(14) obtained in the cooperative model. 
Following a similar line for backbone provider BP， we have a relation: 
。ITB/δKB Y (θPB/δQB) (δQB/δKB) 
-z (θPs/dQs) (θQs/θKB) 
-dCB/dKB 
= RB [-Y (dPB/δQB) (θQB/dY)] 
-dCB/dKB 4-⑪ 
Here， the second term of the first equation disappears， since expansion of BP capacity does 
not influence quality of SP network.Thus， the equation tells that provider BP will expand 
its capacity when an increase in revenue produced by the improved network exceeds the cost 
incurred for the improvement. An increase in FC traffic rises congestion on BP network， 
which results in a fall indelivery rate Pb paid by SP to BP. In the second equation， the 
second factor of the first term means a decrease in revenue of BP effectuated by that fall 
in Pb rate when FC traffic increases. We denote this effect by YBY. Thus， the signal for BP 
to expand its capacity is alternatively expressed by the situation that the value of total 
traffic on BP network evaluated by YBY comes to exceed the value of the present capacity 
24 
valued using the marginal cost of capacity. It shows a difference from the situation in the 
cooperative model， where the value of total traffic on BP network was evaluated by the 
social cost of a fall in quality of FC communication (VYBY). 
5. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION(2) : COMPETITIVE SUPPLY 
We last1y analyse a contemparary situation that many providers supply services 
competitively in each layer of the networks of Internet connection service (offered by SPs) 
and backbone service (offered by BPs)， and see to what extent the results obtained so far 
remain viable in the new environment. When many SPs supply competitively their services 
in their layer of the network， qualities of communication， Qx and Qy， which they offer to 
users are regarded as their respective technical elements relating to their transmission 
capacity Ks: it is considered to be an entrepreneurial decision whether they seek to realize 
high prices by offering service of high quality or to have a large volume of traffic by 
offering that of moderate quality. On the users' side， too， communication qualities， Qx and 
Qy， give them important clues to choose a provider for the maximization of their benefit 
in the use of the Internet. Moreover， for the group of providers BP， it becomes a basic 
business choice how much bandwidth Kb should be offered to providers SP for onward 
delivery of FC traffic originating from them， and the quality of the BP network Qb 
determined with relation to the offered capacity is a characteristic of each provider. Thus， 
a specific quality of a BP network becomes a strategic factor for SPs seeking backbone 
service to find their satisfactory BP. Here， we assume that there are many providers having 
a great variety of these qualities，i.e.，with continuously different values in Qx， Qy， and Qb. 
We take notice of market behavior of a representative provider belonging to each group of 
SPs and BPs in this circumstance. It is presumed that the selected SP provider “r" has 
subscribers of m DC users and n FC users， and that the selected BP provider offers backbone 
connection service to s firms of SP group. 
Firstly， the puopose of choice behavior of SP provider “r" is to maximize the value of its 
net profit function 4-(3). The price equations established in the market under this behavior 
does not differ from those obtained in the monopolistic situation as 4-(4) and 4-(5) (or 4-
(6))， and such is the case with capacity expansion. As to the optimal choice of a BP 
provider， the first-order condition for SP provider “r" gives the equation: 
。[Yr • py (Qy)]/δQB 
=δ[B (QB) + Yr ・PB(QB)]/δQB 5-① 
25 
Here， B (Qb) is the initial connection fee SP pays BP， and the functional form means that 
it is determined with relation to the quality of BP network in the market. When SP makes 
a choice of a BP provider offering the network of higher quality， it will enjoy greater 
revenue by offering users users FC communication of higher quality， while it must pay BP 
more for the FC delivery. The above equation means that the SP “r" will find a BP offering 
such network of quality as the increase in revenue brought by higher quality compensates 
the rise in payment to BP. 
Next， we see differences in the choice of BP from that in the other industrial situations. As 
regards the net profit function， there is nothing different except that the constant initial 
connection fee B is changed into a term SB(QB) expressed by a number of connecting SPs and 
a function of quality of BP network. In the cooperative model and in a case of the 
monopolistic model， al FC traffic originating from SP network was accepted and delivered 
to foreign networks by BP. In the present situation of market， many providers having 
various technical characteristics offer services competitively in each layer of the networks， 
SP and BP. Then， for the part of BP， the amount of bandwidth to offer， i.e.， the volume Y 
of FC traffic to accept， becomes an important choice as well as the network quality Qb 
which is determined by another choice， transmission capacity Kb. On the other hand， the FC 
traffic price itself is determined in the market in relation to demand and supply of FC 
communication influenced by the quality of BP network. 
The profit maximization problem facing BP gives the first-order condition with respect to 
the volume of FC traffic Y to accept， from which we have the following equation: 
PB (QB) = PF + Z (θPs/δQs) (8Qs/δY) 
一[Y(δPB/δQB) + s (δB/δQB)] (θQB/θy) 
Here， Y is the sum of Yr(r= 1，…，s)， traffic volume of each of s firms of providers SP. 
Besides， as to provider “r"， the relation 5-(1) should be satisfied. Thus， using these 
relations， we have 
Y (θpy/θQy) (θQy/δQB) - s (θB/θQB) 
-Y (8PB/δQB) 0 
Applying this to the above equation， we can arrange the price equation as 
p~ (QB) = PF - Y (θpy/8Qy) (8Qy/θQB) (δQB/δY) 
+Z (θPs/8Qs) (8Qs/θY) 5-② 
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Backbone delivery price Pb for FC traffic established in this competitive situation is 
distinguished here by an attached letter c. In the former situation where backbone service is 
supplied by a monopoly BP， the delivery price was given as the equation 4-(14) when 
another delivery price Ps for overseas traffic Z is assumed constant， but when the constancy 
on Ps is not assumed， Pb is expressed as the following equation: 
PB (QB) = PF-Y (eJPB/δQB) (θQB/θY) 
+z (θPs/δQs) (θQs/θy) 
Pb in the monopolistic situation has an ingredient of a decrease in revenue valued using the 
effect of BP congestion on the delivery price of FC traffic in addition to the settlement rate 
and the reduction in payment to SP with respect to onward deliveryof overseas traffic. For 
the price in the competitive situation， the corresponding ingredient is valued using the 
effect of BP congestion on FC communication price (the second term of the equation 5-(2) 
is YYBY). That is， while delivery price Pb is expressed by only influences on BP network 
exerted by an increase in FC traffic in the monopolistic situation， the influences on both BP 
and SP networks are included in that price when providers are in a competitive state. 
The similar difference appears in the expression of the optimal capacity of BP network. 
From the net profit function replacing a constant initial connection fee B with a function 
of the network quality B(Qb) ， the first-order condition for the maximization gives the 
equation: 
Y (8py/θQy) (θQy/δQB) (δQB/θKB) = dC/dKB 5-③ 
In the monopolistic case， we have the following relation from the equation 4-(17) in the 
previous section: 
。IB/8KB= Y (θPB/8QB) (δQB/θKB)-dC/dKB 
That is， in the same way as in the case of a delivery price Pb for FC traffic， in the 
monopolistic supply， BP's profitability of its capacity expansion is known only based on 
the conditions of BP network that the increase in revenue brought by an improvement of 
the network quality owing to the capacity expansion exceeds the cost for it. However， in the 
competitive situation， the economic signal for BP's capacity expansion is that BP's 
contribution to the increase in SP's revenue relating to FC traffic through the improvement 
of BP network quality exceeds the cost for the additional capacity. Here， itis natural that 
the capacity expansion of BP increases BP's revenue itself through a rise in delivery price 
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Pb. 
Finally， in this competitive model， when the delivery price Ps for overseas traffic is 
assumed fixed irrespective of SP network quality in relation to a constant settlement price 
Pf， all the results here are reduced to the same as those in the cooperative model except a 
price Pb for FC traffic which SP pays to BP for onward delivery to foreign networks. That 
is， in the industrial organization where many SP and BP for-profit firms supply Internet 
services competitively， the communication prices established in the market essentially 
correspond to the congestion prices adopted in the cooperative structure to realize efficient 
allocation of network resources by internalizing adverse external effects of usage on the 
quality of communication and networks. It means that those prices are established in 
compliance with individual behaviors of users and providers and that they leads to efficient 
use of scarce resources of the whole network. This result was shown by MacKie-Mason and 
Varian (1955) for a set of homogeneous networks in a single layer. Our analysis has shown 
that the same fact is essentially established in a layered structure having providers 
connected with each other at different levels of networks. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the Internet society， there recently have emerged external diseconomies due to line 
congestion and traffic delays， the extent of which is not negligible. The purpose of this 
paper is to analyze how the congestion pricing to internalize the external effects is viable 
for a layered network structure typically representing the actual market of the Internet 
where for-profit providers supply services competitively. 
As the analytical framework， we propose a model of the Internet society consisting of 
numerous users with various utility functions and two kinds of providers Offering Internet 
services， i.e.， service providers BPs offering connection and other related services to end-
users and backbone providers BPs supplying SPs backbone connection service only. They are 
connected with each other in a layered structure and BPs have channels to communicate 
with foreign networks. Varieties of traffic are communication originating and terminating 
on only SP network domains (DC traffic or communication)， communication originating 
on a SP network and delivered to overseas networks (FC traffic or communication)， and 
traffic originating from foreign networks and delivered to domestic users through BP 
networks. Delivery prices between SP and BP， Ps and Pb， are determined by the conditions 
in the market， but a certain settlement rate for mutual transmission is agreed between BPs 
and its foreign partners. 
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Firstly， in the cooperative organization where the Internet is run for the welfare of the 
whole society， the optimal pricing for DC traffic PX is to internalize the external 
diseconomies caused by network congestion due to additional use of network for that 
traffic. As regards the pricing for FC traffic， the optimal price Py becomes the sum of the 
value of the similar congestion costs incurred by additional use for FC traffic and a 
settlement rate at that time， and has a relation with the optimal price for SC traffic 
expressed as Py=Px+ Pf+ VYBY， where VYBY designates total costs imposed on al the 
FC users by a rise in congestion on BP network due to additional FC traffic. Concerning the 
conditions of capacity expansion， the right signal for SP network is that the value of al 
traffic on SP network evaluated by DC congestion price at that time exceeds the value of SP 
capacity measured using its marginal cost of capacity. The expansion increases BP's profit 
when the value of traffic on its network evaluated by the costs of congestion VYBY exceeds 
the value BP capacity evaluated by the marginal cost of capacity. From the conditions of 
the capacity expansion， the DC traffic price Px can be expressed as the value of SP network 
capacity per traffic and the FC traffic price Py can be calculated by adding Px， Pf and the 
value of BP network capacity per traffic on its network. These relations enable us to 
evaluate the optimal prices for traffic only on more accessible information of traffic 
volumes and the values of network capacity， not knowing utility functions of users and 
quality functions of networks. 
Next， we obtain the traffic prices established in the industrial structure where each 
providers of SP and BP are for-profit firms independently run for respective profit 
maximization purposes. The network constitution itself has no change from that in the 
previous cooperative situation. The only difference lies in the form of management. The DC 
traffic price Px is obtained as the value of adding ZSX(reduction in delivery revenue of SP 
caused by a fall in SP network quality due to additional DC traffic) to the optimal DC price 
in the cooperative model. The FC traffic price becomes in this situation the sum of the 
optimal price Py in the previous situation， the additional cost ZSX from a fall in the 
network quality， and the value YBFY (a change in net revenue of BP regarding FC traffic 
delivery due to additional FC traffic). It is equivalent to the value obtained by addition of 
VYBY and YPBY (a change in payments to BP regarding FC traffic delivery brought by 
additional FC traffic). Concerning capacity expansion， the economic signal is given by the 
same relation as in the previous model， by substituting the price established in this 
monopolistic model for that in the cooperative model. On the other hand， as to BP network， 
the value of al traffic on the network is measured by the cost YBY(reduction in delivery 
revenue of FC traffic caused by the effect of additional FC traffic on delivery price Pb) 
while measured by the cost YYBY (reduction in delivery revenue of FC traffic caused by the 
effect of additional FC traffic on FC traffic price Py) in the cooperative situation. Then， 
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expansion of capacity becomes profitable for BP when that vaJue of the traffic exceeds the 
value of capacity. It is suggested under the general presumptions about price functions 
relating to congestion and cost functions of capacity that the traffic prices become higher 
and the optimal capacity become smaller in the monopolistic situation than those in the 
cooperative situation. 
When we introduce the assumption that delivery price of overseas traffic Ps is set a 
constant value between SP and BP in relation to a constant settlement rate Pf agreed 
between BP and its foreign partner， the expression for DC traffic price is reduced to the 
same as the congestion price， and the condition for capacity expansion of SP network 
becomes equal to that in the cooperative model. As to the FC traffic price， the equation has 
an expression of depriving the effect caused by a change in Ps of the original equation. The 
introduction of the assumption makes no change in capacity expansion of BP network. 
When we further introduce an assumption that BP decides bandwidth to supply for FC 
traffic， pricing expression is reduced to the same as that in the cooperative model for FC 
traffic， too. In the monopolistic model， a delivery price for FC traffic Pb is established as 
the sum of a settlement rate Pf and a cost YBY (reduction in revenue of BP caused by a rise 
in BP network congestion due to additional FC traffic) in the equilibrium， and with this 
connection， expanding BP capacity is taken place with the signals that the value of al 
traffic on the network evaluated by YBY( =Pb-Pf) reaches the present value of capacity. 
It is generally observed that the equilibrium state in the monopolistic structure of supply 
is considerablly different from the optimal state in the cooperative structure， but that 
there is little differeIl:ce in results about SP network and DC communication terminating on 
SP domain between these two situations while the differences become greater for results 
about BP network and FC communication， both having a direct relation to foreign 
networks. However， as we introduce assumptions of a constant delivery price BP pays to SP 
and of a BP's decision of bandwidth to offer SP， the equilibrium state of the monopolistic 
model approaches the optimal situation in the cooperative model. The cooperative model is 
a prototype of market structure which is reached by intoducing further the possibility of 
individual choices of al the entities concerned with the network including free entry into 
the market. The supply side consists of many for-profit providers with a variety of 
technical features of network， i.e.， network qualities and communication qualities， in each 
group of SPs and BPs， and they offer connection or backbone service competitively to their 
customers， i.e.， users or SPs. Thus， users' choice begins with what qualities of network and 
communication their provider SP should have， and SPs' first choice is also what quality of 
network their BP should have. On the BPs' side， in addition to the physical transmission 
capacity Cmaximum bandwidth)， bandwidth to actually offer (or total traffic to accept) 
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becomes an important business strategy in relation to a delivery price reflecting the quality 
of network. In this competitive situation， the results of the economic choice by individual 
users and providers are found al equivalent to those obtained in the coopera'tIve model 
except a delivery price of FC traffic SP pays to BP， Pb. It means that the congestion pricing 
introduced to improve efficiency in network resource use is basically viable in the present 
decentralized and layered structure on the Internet. 
In the field of studies on information networks. even when focused on the relations of 
pricing schemes with efficient use of the resources， researches have just started with a lot 
of work to be done. It is difficult to conceive a line of future researches in the light of the 
rapid and sustained growth of information technology and the industrial development 
accompanying it. In thc circumstances， we indicate here some of the research subjects to be 
tackled with and some possible lines of research. 
Regarding problems with a direct connection with this paper， itcould be the first subject to 
extend the analysis to a model which includes congestion effects caused by overseas traffic 
originating on foreign networks with relation to a settlement problem of BPs with their 
overseas partners. In so doing， itwill be necessary to consider a principle uf “recei ver-pays" 
instead of， or along with，a principle of“sender-pays" which this paper implicitly assumed， 
when we see today's proliferation of the use of WWW in the public. The problem of 
covering the costs of transmission infrastructure remains an important problem though 
this paper dealt with the marginal costs related to the conditions of capacity expansion. 
Concerning Internet pricing， itcan be said at least theoretically that “the problem of the 
commons" of network congestion due to“over-grazing" by users is generally solved in 
compliance with economic choice of entities concerned by introducing a scheme to induce 
users to internalize the effect of their use of network， i.e.， externality of congestion， even 
in the decentralized and layered structure of today's real networks. This was the main 
result of this paper. The pricing scheme of communication considered in this paper belongs 
to a sort of“usage-sensitive pricing" in terms of McKnight and Baily(Jl)， and we have 
focused our attention on the part of their definition of the pricing scheme， the “non-zero 
marginal monetary cost of sending another bit" in relation to efficient use of network 
resources. For the pricing scheme of the Internet，“flat-rate" has been widely used in 
connection with the special process of development in the U.S.， and these years， offers of 
that scheme by providers are more frequently seen in Japan as the market becomes more 
competitive among them. It is claimed that the flat-rate pricing has an advantages over 
(11) See McKight，L.W. and J.P.Baily (1997)， p.13. 
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other schemes in that users have no uncertainty in their communication budgets and that it 
enables providers to reduce costs of collecting fees on account of its simple scheme. Some 
people concerned with technological aspects of the Internet are said to maintain that it 
should be most suitable scheme for the development of the so-called “Internet culture" in 
view of the growing process and the technological features of the Internet. Costs of fee 
collection， inparticular， becomes one of the important issues with which we should deal in 
the theoretical analysis of communication pricing as well as collecting methods in 
connection with the future technological developments such as improvement in protocols 
and inventions of new applications. The development of affairs may affect the theoretical 
advantage of congestion pricing. Furthermore， accompanied with a growing variety of 
communication contents and methods in the future，“transaction-based pricing" instead of 
usage-based pricing will be introduced in the market， and it gives us a problem of 
comparative analysis among these schemes for a subject of future studies. 
In the comparative studies among pricing schemes， the results will depend on what sort of 
new technologies are going to be developed in the actual use of the Internet， and hence new 
facets and lines of analysis will be required for the economic studies on pricing and use of 
network resources as such new applications are actually introduced in the real world. 
Almost al the economic studies on information networks made so far including the present 
paper are mainly concerned with the analysis of “point-to-point" communication. From 
now on， larger efforts must be addressed to the problem of multicast flow of information; 
a data originates on a network domain and is replicated every time when it travels through 
other network nodes， forming a tree-and-branch structure of information in layered 
networks. Reflecting a natural line of development in Internet technology in the near 
future， the problem of efficient use of resources with regard to ATM has already been 
placed on the research agenda (12) . 
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